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PIERCING THE CHOCOLATE VEIL: NINTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS CHILD 
COCOA SLAVES TO SUE UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE IN DOE I 
V. NESTLE USA 
LINDSEY E. WILKINSON* 
“[H]umanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the na-
tions of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in 
their individual and collective interest.”1 
I. HARVESTING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have become increasingly susceptible to 
litigation for extraterritorial violations of international humanitarian law.2  Until 
now, MNCs have generally avoided exposure to such litigation amid the uncer-
tainty of a weak, ineffective international regulatory system.3  With the Ninth 
Circuit at the forefront of the debate, it appears that the United States is no longer 
a safe harbor for corporate actors who aid and abet human rights violations 
through their global network of contractors and suppliers.4 
In a globalized marketplace, MNCs wield tremendous power and economic 
influence.  The transnational movement of goods and people “mak[e] borders and 
state controls increasingly antiquated.”5  MNCs utilize business tactics to max-
imize productivity and profits.6  MNCs outsource labor to countries with weak 
 
 *  J.D. 2016 Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, a staff writer on the 
Villanova Law Review; B.A. 2011 Tufts University, International Relations and Economics.  I 
would like to thank the Editors of the Villanova Law Review, retired Villanova Professor Jo-
seph Dellapenna for his dynamic courses in comparative law and transnational litigation, and 
my parents, Thomas and Kathleen ‘81, for their encouragement and support of justice for all. 
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).   
2. See Kathryn Manza, Making Chocolate Sweeter: How to Encourage Hershey Com-
pany to Clean Up its Supply Chain and Eliminate Child Labor, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
389, 393 (2014) (citing KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS WITH 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 56–58 (2000)); see also Saman Zia-Zafri, Su-
ing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 88 (1999) (“American courts, comfortable with the legal fiction that 
equates legal individuals (i.e., corporations) mutatis mutandis with natural individuals for pur-
poses of civil liability, have expressed no conceptual difficulty using the [Alien Tort Claims 
Act] against private legal entities.”).   
3. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational 
Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015). 
4. See Doe v. Nestle USA (Nestle USA), 766 F.3d 1013, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 136 S.Ct. 798 (2016).   
5. PETER ANDREAS AND ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: 
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 247 (2008); see also 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—
Part 2 (Apple, Inc.) S. Hrg. 113-90, at 2 (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys /pkg/CHRG-
113shrg81657/pdf/CHRG-113shrg81657.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RD7-JF69] (highlighting 
complex avoidance schemes used by U.S.-based multinational corporations to move profits to 
offshore tax havens and amass estimated $1.9 trillion in profits).   
6. See Manza, supra note 2, at 407 (describing how MNCs control their supply chains 
and avoid government regulation). 
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regulatory institutions.7  This promotes inter-jurisdictional competition for for-
eign investment that drives race-to-the-bottom economic policies to the detriment 
of the social welfare in the targeted communities.8  Because foreign investment 
tends to put power and money into the hands of corrupt officials, the standards of 
living in these countries, where labor remains inexpensive, fail to improve.9 
The interests of the state are a reflection of its regulatory strength, type of 
government, and administrative institutions.  In a global economy, government 
interests often overlap but do not always align.10  In democratic countries with 
strong civil societies, legislators responded to popular demand for labor reforms 
with regulatory measures and governmental institutions.11  In countries fraught 
with corruption, social welfare typically remains stagnant and labor conditions 
fail to improve.12  In the United States, corporate lobbyists undermine legislative 
efforts to address MNCs’ operations overseas, which increases corporate wealth 
to the detriment of foreign workers.13  Non-governmental actors have tried for 
many years to make a multilateral regulatory framework to govern international 
labor standards.14  However, these initiatives lack the power of the rule of law; 
 
7. See Kemi Mustapha, Note, Taste of Child Labor Not So Sweet: A Critique of Regu-
latory Approaches to Combating Child Labor Abuses by the U.S. Chocolate Industry, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1163, 1169 (2010) (“[W]ith the advance of globalization, the concern is that corpo-
rations will take advantage of lenient regulations in foreign countries and commit violations of 
international human rights and labor standards in pursuit of profit making.”).   
8. See, e.g., Regina E. Rauxloh, A Call for the End of Impunity for Multinational Cor-
porations, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 297, 299 (2008) (discussing how “race-to-the-bottom” 
phenomenon occurs when countries try to compete for foreign investment).   
9. See, e.g., Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and Globalization, BROOKINGS INST., at 2-3 
(Apr. 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb79.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6B3J-39GF] (describing obstacles that countries face when corrupt govern-
ment officials steal from international investment funds). 
10. See Zia-Zafri, supra note 2, at 86 (“These interests, and the legal control of each 
country over a corporation, are not perfectly aligned . . . .”).   
11. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: 
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2013) (proposing that “pluralistic polit-
ical institutions” and economic institutions enable growth at critical junctures).  
12. See FREDERICK COOPER, AFRICA SINCE 1940: THE PAST OF THE PRESENT 92 (11th 
ed. 2009) (noting that post-colonial regimes “reinforced the externally dependent economy of 
the colonial era”). 
13. See, e.g., Norex Petroleum v. Access Indus., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“‘[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.’” 
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010))).  For a further discus-
sion in favor of corporate accountability, see Melvin L. Otey, Why RICO’s Extraterritorial 
Reach is Properly Coextensive with the Reach of its Predicates, 14 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 33, 45 
(2015) (describing how international commerce and transnational competition produce “many 
of the same corruption problems that attend domestic business dealings”).  
14. See, e.g., INT’L LABOR ORG., ILO DECLARATION ON SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR A FAIR 
GLOBALIZATION 3(2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—-cabi-
net/documents/genericdocument/wcms_371208.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2BU-5AVZ] (advocat-
ing Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization, building upon Philadelphia Declaration 
of 1944 and Declaration on Fundamental Privileges and Rights); ISO 26000—Social Responsi-
bility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,  https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-responsibil-
ity.html [https://perma.cc/954A-GQUA] (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (seeking to promote social 
responsibility standards, including contributions to sustainable development, respect for inter-
national norms of behavior, and respect for human rights).   
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absent enforcement by a competent judiciary, they are nothing but exalted volun-
tary measures.15 
In Doe I v. Nestle USA,16 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a proposed 
class of child slaves could state a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute of 
1789 (ATS) against the chocolate candy company Nestle USA for violating the 
“law of nations” through its use of forced child labor on chocolate plantations in 
Africa.17  The Ninth Circuit held that the international prohibition against slavery 
is “universal and may be asserted against the corporate defendants.”18  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs made sufficient allegations to establish Nes-
tle USA and its corporate suppliers knowingly and purposefully aided and abetted 
a violation of the universal prohibition against slavery to satisfy the mens rea 
standard of culpability for a corporate actor.19  Rejecting the notion that corpora-
tions should receive blanket immunity for human rights violations, the Ninth Cir-
cuit utilized a “norm-by-norm” approach to liability.20 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the child cocoa slaves established a plau-
sible cause of action under the ATS against corporate defendants for aiding and 
abetting forced child labor in violation of international law.21  By contrast, the 
Second and Fourth Circuits have concluded that knowledge of human rights vio-
lations alone is insufficient, requiring the plaintiff to allege that the defendant 
purposefully intended to further the criminal conduct.22 
This Article posits that corporations domiciled in the United States are not 
immune from liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law 
abroad.  The ATS provides the district courts with the power to pierce the corpo-
rate veil based on the common law doctrine of respondeat superior and impose 
liability when plaintiffs establish a nexus of domestic conduct to infer a violation 
 
15. See, e.g., Zia-Zafri, supra note 2, at 85, 85 n.11 (describing failed efforts of ILO’s 
monitoring of Unocal project with self-reporting of forced labor and slavery in connection with 
pipeline projects of French oil company Total and U.S. oil company Unocal). 
16. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016). 
17. See id. at 1017–18; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
18. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1022.  The court explained: 
 
The prohibition against slavery applies to state actors and non-state actors alike, and 
there are no rules exempting acts of enslavement carried out on behalf of a corpora-
tion.  Indeed, it would be contrary to both the categorical nature of the prohibition on 
slavery and the moral imperative underlying that prohibition to conclude that incor-
poration leads to legal absolution for acts of enslavement. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
19. See id. at 1024 (concluding that plaintiffs “satisfy the more stringent purpose stand-
ard” and, thus, also the less-stringent knowledge standard) . 
20. See id. at 1022 (reasoning that corporate actors were liable for aiding and abetting 
universal norms, which are applicable to all actors).   
21. See id. at 1026–27.  
22. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[F]or liability to attach 
under the ATS for aiding and abetting a violation of international law, a defendant must provide 
substantial assistance with the purpose of facilitating the alleged violation.”); Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding 
plaintiffs failed to show that oil company provided “substantial assistance” with purpose of 
facilitating human rights abuses).   
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of jus cogens, which are universally recognized as “sufficiently definite norms of 
international law.”23 
Part II (A) of this Note discusses the history of the ATS from its enactment 
in 1789 and the subsequent recognition of violations of the law of nations as jus 
cogens norms of international law.24  Part II(B) discusses doctrines of judicial 
restraint, including, but not limited to, the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, such as Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, PLC (Jesner),25 in which a plurality of the Court voted to preclude ATS 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation with a subsidiary in New York City.26  Part 
II(C) discusses the circuit split on aiding and abetting liability.27  Part III provides 
a factual background, procedural history, and legal analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Nestle USA.28  Part IV discusses the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s denial of certiorari in Nestle USA and the future of human rights litigation 
against MNCs.29  Finally, Part V concludes the Note.30 
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 GRANTS DISTRICT COURTS ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE “SPECIFIC, OBLIGATORY, AND UNIVERSAL” 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
The ATS, as originally enacted in section nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
stated: “[T]he district courts shall [ ] have cognizance, concurrent with the courts 
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where 
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”31  Upon the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the ATS was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and, to this day, states: “The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”32  The statute confers jurisdiction when “an alien sues . . . for a tort . . . 
 
23. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Kiobel II), 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013).  For a dis-
cussion of jus cogens, see infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text.   
24. For a discussion of the history of the ATS, the law of nations, and customary inter-
national law, see infra notes 31–64 and accompanying text. 
25. No. 16-499 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
26. For a discussion of prudential doctrines of restraint and limits on ATS jurisdiction, 
see infra notes 75–93, the Executive branch policy limitations, see infra notes 93–96 and ac-
companying text, and for a detailed background and analysis of Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, see 
infra notes 98–113 and accompanying text. 
27. For a discussion of the circuit split on the standard for aiding and abetting liability, 
see infra notes 114–22. 
28. For a discussion of background and procedural history of Doe I v. Nestle USA, see 
infra notes 123–59.  For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to hold corporations ac-
countable, see infra notes 160–76. 
29. For a discussion of the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nestle USA versus 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, see infra notes 177–86. 
30. For a conclusion of the Note, see infra notes 187–93. 
31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The ATS and Judiciary Act 
of 1789, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 461, 461 n.1 (1989) (citation omitted); Kurtis A. Kemper, Annota-
tion, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350): Tort in Violation 
of Law of Nations or Treaty of United States, 61 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 171, § 1 (2012).   
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committed in violation of the law of nations.”33  This section will examine the 
history of the ATS, as the source for the district courts’ “explicit enumerated au-
thority to define and punish international law violations.”34 
Under the U.S. Constitution, the district courts have a constitutional obliga-
tion to uphold the United States’ international legal commitments.35  Our Su-
preme Court has cautioned the courts against exercising ATS jurisdiction over 
tortious conduct arising outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.36  For prac-
tical reasons, such as sovereignty and territoriality, this power is limited to a suf-
ficiently definite violation of a treaty or norm of international law that implicates 
United States’ interests, domestic conduct, and satisfies traditional notions of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, such as where the corporate defendant has 
a principal place of business in or significant contacts with the United States.37 
A. The Original Transitory Torts: Violations of Safe Conducts, Infringement on 
the Rights of Ambassadors, and Piracy 
The history of the ATS demonstrates that Congress intended for the district 
courts to assure respect for the rights of foreigners and provide a remedy for vio-
lations of jus cogens committed by U.S. citizens.38  Throughout the Constitutional 
Convention, Congress prioritized the protection of foreigners in the United 
States.39  As such, the First Continental Congress intended for the district courts 
to serve as a forum for foreigners injured by American nationals to establish rap-
port among nations like Great Britain and France for protecting individual rights 
of visitors and respecting the rights of foreigners.40 
 
33. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
34. Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses Under 
Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. 2204, 2283 (2015). 
35. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Trea-
ties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby.”); Cleveland & Dodge, supra note 34, at 2231, 2238. 
36. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (“[A]t the time of enact-
ment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by 
the law of nations and recognized at common law.”). 
37. See Zia-Zafri, supra note 2, at 88 (discussing “a number of political, jurisdictional 
and practical limitations, drawn from international and domestic sources, constrain the ATCA’s 
applicability primarily to MNCs based in the U.S., or those MNCs that have significant contacts 
with the United States”). 
38. Compare Thomas Weatherall, Note, Lessons from the Alien Tort Statute: Jus Co-
gens as the Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1373 (2015) (citation omitted) (“[T]he estab-
lishment of a category of jus cogens norms demarcated the contemporary law of nations, which 
U.S. courts have ascertained with some confidence as norms of contemporary international law 
comparable in stature to the eighteenth-century law of nations.”), with Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & 
Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 448 
(2011) (“In 1789, every nation had a duty to redress certain violations of the law of nations 
committed by its citizens or subjects against other nations or their citizens.”). 
39. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715–16 (2004) (citing JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed., 1893)). 
40. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 38, at 552 (“Recognizing the full historical context 
of the ATS is necessary if courts are to achieve the Supreme Court’s goal of faithfully interpret-
ing the statute in accordance with the expectations of the First Congress.”).   
5
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Official recognition of the rights of foreigners began with an act designed 
specifically to protect ambassadors and diplomats.41  The 1781 Resolution, 
passed by the First Continental Congress, recognized a private remedy for diplo-
matic offenses; the Resolution demarcated “an act of international politics, for 
the recommendation was part of a program to assure the world that the new Re-
public would observe the law of nations.”42  In 1784, the Chavalier de Long-
champs verbally and physically assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in 
Philadelphia in the famous “Marbois-Incident.”43  The way this incident was han-
dled sparked ridicule from prominent members of the international community, 
“and concern over the inadequate vindication of the law of nations persisted 
through the time of the Constitutional Convention.”44 
In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
First Congress “intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest 
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.”45  In 1789, the First Con-
tinental Congress promulgated the ATS, with the intent to empower the district 
courts with original jurisdiction over a limited number of foreign tort claims by 
foreign citizens against citizens of the United States, recognizing that the “failure 
to redress . . . such torts violated the law of nations.”46 
The prominent figures of the new Republic and the international community 
stressed the importance of protecting the rights of foreigners against torts com-
mitted by U.S. citizens in U.S. courts throughout the Constitutional era.  In Sep-
tember 1794, several ships guided by three Americans along with a crew of 
French revolutionaries made their way ashore and attacked a British colony in 
Sierra Leone.47  In response, Attorney General William Bradford (who prose-
cuted the Marbois Incident)48 wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, expressing 
the need for courts to have extraterritorial jurisdiction to provide a civil remedy 
where foreigners were injured by American nationals abroad.49  To many schol-
ars, Bradford’s letter signified that ATS jurisdiction extended to extraterritorial 
 
41.  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (citing An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, § 8, 1 Stat. 118). (“Uppermost in the legislative mind appears to have 
been offenses against ambassadors[.]”).  
42.  Id. at 722 n.15.  
43. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (Dall.)111, 111–12 (Phila. Ct. Oyer & 
Term. 1784); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716–17 (describing Marbois Incident, Dutch Ambassa-
dor, and limits of nascent nation’s judicial system at time of Constitutional Convention). 
44. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 25 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (speech of Randolph, J.)). 
45. Id. at 720.  The Sosa Court also suggested that “the ATS was meant to underwrite 
litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the law of nations,” which the 
States could define in terms of positive, universal law.  See id. at 721–22. 
46. Bellia & Clark, supra note 38, at 446 (internal quotations omitted).   
47. See Ishai Mooreville, A Question of Sovereignty: The History Behind Attorney Gen-
eral Bradford’s 1795 Opinion on the Alien Tort Statute, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 217, 
227-28 (2013) (noting that one ship was from Massachusetts and another from New York). 
48. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721 (noting that it is unlikely that, at that time, Bradford “un-
derstood the ATS to provide jurisdiction over what must have amounted to common law causes 
of action”). 
49. See generally William J. Bradford, Breach of Neutrality, 1 U.S. OP. ATT’Y GEN. 57 
(1795).  For a further discussion of Attorney General Bradford’s letter, see Mooreville, supra 
6
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torts committed by U.S. nationals against foreigners on foreign soil “in all cases 
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty 
of the United States.”50 
As we understand the history of the ATS today, the most prominent figures 
of the new Republic believed a competent, powerful, and sophisticated judicial 
branch required original jurisdiction to adjudicate over such claims; under more 
specific, modern terminology, this would mean a degree of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion to define and punish violations of those who aid and abet violations of the 
law of nations and treaties to provide a remedy for torts against foreigners.51  The 
First Congress vested the district court with this power in the absence of the web 
of federal legislation that exists today.52  They understood that punishing viola-
tions of international law would prevent the new Republic from becoming a safe 
harbor for “a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”53 
By the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1789, there were three prin-
cipal “transitory torts” recognized under the law of nations: (1) violation of “safe 
conducts,” (2) “infringement of the rights of ambassadors,” and (3) “piracy.”54  
“During the eighteenth century, it was taken for granted on both sides of the At-
lantic that the law of nations forms a part of the common law.”55  Extraterritorial 
 
note 47, at 234–35. 
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bradford, 1 Op. Atty. 
Gen. at 59).  As scholars have explained, “the ATS was originally intended to be limited to civil 
suits by aliens against American citizens only, but would have encompassed all acts committed 
by U.S. citizens extraterritorially or in United States territory.”  Mooreville, supra note 47, at 
234–35 (citing Bellia & Clark, supra note 38, at 520–521 n.356). 
51. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 38, at 516 n.345 (noting that President George Wash-
ington’s neutrality proclamation declared that American citizens were “liable to punishment or 
forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of 
the powers at war with each other” (citation omitted)).  For a further discussion of “prescriptive 
jurisdiction,” see Kathleen Hixson, Note Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 129–37 
(1988).   
52. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[W]e believe it is 
sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply 
as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international 
law.”). 
53. Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108, 127 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).  The plurality ex-
plained: 
 
[I]t would find jurisdiction under this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs on 
American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s con-
duct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and 
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe 
harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common en-
emy of mankind. 
 
Id. 
54. See id. at 119. 
55. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
**263–64 (1st ed., 1765–69)).  When the British Navy captured two Spanish and three French 
slave ships off the coast of what is now Nigeria, the British established an international com-
mission that resulted in the liberation of almost 80,000 slaves by international tribunals.  See, 
e.g., Randall Lesaffer, Vienna and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS BLOG 
7
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causes of action expanded from the three original transitory torts to include war 
prizes and admiralty fraud.56  The decisions of international tribunals post-World 
War II became recognized universally as authoritative sources of customary in-
ternational law.57 
1. Law of Nations Against Slavery 
During 1814 and 1815, the anti-Napoleonic powers formed the Congress of 
Vienna and signed the Treaty of Vienna, in which they pledged to take steps to 
eliminate slavery.58  In 1822, Justice Joseph Story deduced that the prohibition 
against slavery arose under the “law of nations.”59  In the case of La Jeune Eu-
genie,60 Justice Story identified the prohibition of slavery as an emerging legal 
norm.61  He considered incorporating the Treaty of Vienna into the common law 
 
(June 8, 2015), http://blog.oup.com/2015/06/vienna-abolition-slave-
trade/#sthash.DaAsxEuT.dpuf [https://perma.cc/L7JU-WVTF] 
56. See, e.g., Port v. United States, 1860 WL 4869, at *1 (Ct. Cl. 1860) (“This booty 
naturally belongs to the sovereign making war, no less than the conquests, for he alone has such 
claims against the hostile nation as warrant him to seize on their property and convert it to his 
own use.” (citation omitted)).   
By 1904, it was well-established that “[t]he modern rule of the law of nations is cer-
tainly that [a] ship shall be subject to condemnation for carrying contraband goods.”  The Lucy, 
39 Ct. Cl. 221, 223 (1904) (citation omitted).  The courts recognized the “well-known maxim 
that a person seeking relief in equity must come with clean hands is as potent in prize courts or 
in international tribunals as in courts of equity.”  Id. at 225.   
 
Fraud, deception, and improper attempts to deprive a belligerent of his belligerent 
rights tend to embroil friendly nations in dispute and misunderstanding; and it is for 
the welfare of the neutral as well as of the belligerent nation that a transaction stained 
with them be stamped as unlawful, without justification, and without redress.   
 
Id. 
57. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 271 (2d Cir. 2007) (de-
scribing decisions of International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg post-WWII as authoritative 
sources of customary international law); accord Flores v. S. Peru Copper, 414 F.3d 233, 244 
n.18 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 nn.39–40 (2d Cir. 2003). 
58. See, e.g., Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Reflecting on the Rule of Law, Its Reciprocal Re-
lation with Rights, Legitimacy and Other Concepts and Institutions, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. 
& COM. 233, 240 n.26 (2005) (citing Declaration of the Eight Courts (Austria, France, Great 
Britain, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Sweden) Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave 
Trade, signed at Vienna); Lesaffer, supra note 55. 
59. See United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1822) 
(No. 15,551).  Justice Story explained:  
 
Now the law of nations may be deduced, first, from the general principles of right 
and justice, applied to the concerns of individuals, and thence to the relations and 
duties of nations; or, secondly, in things indifferent or questionable, from the cus-
tomary observances and recognitions of civilized nations; or, lastly, from the con-
ventional or positive law, that regulates the intercourse between states. 
 
Id. at 846.   
60. 26 F. Cas. 832 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551). 
61. See id. at 841 (establishing liability of nationals who cause harm “through the in-
strumentality of private agents in foreign countries, who would be ready to assume a nominal 
8
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as a document reflecting the “practice and custom” of sovereigns.62  Justice Story 
felt he was “bound to consider the [slave] trade an offence against the universal 
law of society and in all cases, where it is not protected by a foreign government, 
to deal with it as an offence carrying with it the penalty of confiscation.”63 
La Jeune Eugenie demonstrates that early constitutional scholars, such as 
Justice Story, believed the ATS provided jurisdiction to punish a violation of the 
law of nations according to the modern “practice and custom among sovereigns” 
and fashion a remedy in accord with the standards of the international commu-
nity, where the court had in personam or in rem jurisdiction over the tortfeasor or 
the defendant’s assets.64 
2. Conceptualizing the Law of Nations as Jus Cogens 
In 1980, a Second Circuit panel held that foreign victims of torture could sue 
under the ATS in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.65  The court held that the ATS provided 
the district courts with jurisdiction to define violations of the law of nations under 
the common law.66  The panel believed the ATS would fulfill “the ageless dream 
to free all people from brutal violence.”67  Such idealism risked opening the flood-
gates of transnational litigation to human rights litigation on behalf of foreign tort 
victims; however, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s approach to 
ATS jurisdiction and the notion of a federal common law in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.68 
Many reasonable scholars call for judges to conceptualize the law of nations 
in terms of jus cogens.69  Jus cogens are “‘peremptory norm[s]’ of international 
law . . . , define[d] as the ‘general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation.’”70  Jus cogens are a form of natural law 
 
ownership, no one, that has been much acquainted with the real business of this commerce, 
would be inclined to doubt or deny”). 
62. See id. at 832 (discussing universal norm prohibiting slavery into federal common 
law). 
63. Id. at 847.  In that case, “American citizens were engaged in the traffic [of slaves],” 
[and Justice Story reasoned that it] is manifest, that they would conceal their interests under a 
foreign flag . . . [to] facilitate their designs, and favour their escape from punishment.”  Id. at 
841. 
64. See id. (noting that slave ship landed in Massachusetts harbor and was moored under 
the jurisdiction of admiralty court). 
65. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (holding that foreign torture victims could sue under ATS). 
66.  See id.  The Filartiga court stated: “The law of nations forms an integral part of the 
common law, and a review of the history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution demon-
strates that it became a part of the common law of the United States upon the adoption of the 
Constitution.”  Id. 
67. Id. at 890.   
68. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).   
69. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 
25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)) (recognizing that torture by state officials violates jus cogens); 
see also Zia-Zafri, supra note 2, at 91 (arguing that law of nations “strongly resemble jus cogens 
norms”).  For a further discussion of jus cogens, see generally Weatherall, supra note 38, at 
1373.   
70. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. K 
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that reflect fundamental rights of human beings applicable universally, every-
where, at all times, and apply to all actors.71  The prohibitions defined as jus co-
gens include the universal prohibition of crimes against humanity, torture, geno-
cide, slavery, apartheid, war crimes, and terrorism.72  Importantly, jus cogens are 
limited to “the most serious violations of contemporary international law recog-
nized and accepted by the international community as a whole.”73  Judicial dis-
cretion to adjudicate violations of jus cogens derives from the state’s authority 
and obligation to uphold universal law “without regard to territoriality or the na-
tionality of the offenders.”74 
B. The “Charming” Doctrines of Judicial Restraint 
In 1804, in the case of Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,75 Justice Mar-
shall created the Charming Betsy Doctrine, holding that “an act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (internal citations omitted)).  “[T]he supremacy of jus cogens extends 
over all rules of international law; norms that have attained the status of jus cogens ‘prevail over 
and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with 
them.’”  Id. at 716 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. K (AM. LAW INST. 1987)).  Officially, the term jus cogens refers to 
“a peremptory norm of general international law [that] is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is per-
mitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law hav-
ing the same character.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations art. 53, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 345 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
71. See Weatherall, supra note 38, at 1362 (noting that these obligations exist beyond 
consent of states).   
 
The universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg—
rights against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts—are the direct ances-
tors of the universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens.  In the words 
of the International Court of Justice, these norms, which include “principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person,” are the concern of all states; “they 
are obligations erga omnes.” 
 
Id. at 1372 (quoting Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715).  If the obligation of international law 
is erga omnes, the obligation for a state to make reparation may flow from a shared resource or 
multilateral human rights convention.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 Reporters’ Notes 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  According to 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations: 
 
The obligation of a state to terminate a violation of international law may include 
discontinuance, revocation, or cancellation of the act (whether legislative, adminis-
trative, or judicial) that caused the violation; abstention from further violation; or 
performance of an act that the state was obligated but failed to perform. 
 
Id. § 901 cmt. c. 
72. See Weatherall, supra note 38, at 1375–76. 
73. Id. at 1379 (citation omitted). 
74. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(a), (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987)).  
75. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/2
30 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 63: p. 20 
construction remains.”76  This “canon stems from a separation of powers principle 
that prevents judicial encroachment into the foreign affairs prerogatives of the 
political branches;” however, others strongly disagree with that interpretation.77  
Some scholars recognize that “this rationale sees the canon as preserving the Con-
stitution’s express apportionment of foreign relations powers to the Executive 
and the legislature.”78  Regardless, in The Nereide,79 Justice Marshall clarified 
that absent a specific Congressional enactment, United States courts are “bound 
by the law of nations[,] which is a part of the law of the land.”80 
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Prudential doctrines of judicial restraint in transnational litigation derive 
from the principle of “comity” among nations, a principle based on mutual re-
spect for the sovereignty of other nations and restraint from interfering outside 
territorial or physical jurisdictional bounds.81  The hurdles foreign litigants must 
overcome in transnational cases include: (1) jurisdiction, (2) sufficiency of the 
pleading to establish an actionable claim, (3) certifying a class, (4) statutes of 
limitation, and (5) motions to dismiss, particularly on the basis of forum non con-
veniens.82  In addition, there are several doctrines the court will consider: (1) in-
ternational comity, (2) citizenship of the parties, (3) the nature of the conduct in 
question bearing on U.S. interests, (4) foreign policy interests of the United States 
(political question, act of state, and foreign affairs doctrines), and (5) U.S. public 
policy interests.83 
In Sosa, the Supreme Court explicitly enumerated five factors that courts 
should carefully consider before asserting ATS jurisdiction: (1) limit the number 
of actionable international norms; (2) refrain from “exercising innovative author-
ity” to create federal common law; (3) interpret legislation only to the extent Con-
gress has demonstrated intent to give the law extraterritorial effect; (4) consider 
 
76. Id. at 118 (citing Federal Nonintercourse Act, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (expired 
1801)) (reversing foreign ship owner’s claim for damages against own agent who brought cargo 
into United States due to conflict with federal law). 
77. Note, The Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary Interna-
tional Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (2008). 
78. Id. at 1219 (citation omitted).   
79. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815). 
80. Id. at 423 (emphasis added) (“Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the 
law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.”). 
81. See, e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 598 (9th Cir. 2014) (“International 
comity is a doctrine of prudential abstention, one that counsels voluntary forbearance when a 
sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction that a second sovereign also has a legiti-
mate claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law.” (quotation and citation omit-
ted)). 
82. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Baldwin, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doc-
trine of Forum Non Conveniens, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 749, 750 n.5 (2007) (noting obstacles 
foreign litigants face when filing suit in United States). 
83. See Mujica, 771 F.3d at 605-07 (listing various factors to consider before exercising 
ATS jurisdiction); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 69 F. Supp. 3d. 75, 90–92 (D. D.C. 2014) 
(discussing “abstention on the basis of international comity” and foreign affairs preemption, 
which “holds that in certain cases where state laws implicate foreign affairs, those laws may be 
preempted, even absent any conflict with federal law.”). 
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the potential for “collateral consequences” for the foreign relations of the United 
States; and (5) abstain from the use of “judicial creativity” in defining norms 
given the consensus that the ATS is “only jurisdictional.”84  “[W]hether a norm 
is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably 
must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of mak-
ing that cause available to litigants in federal courts.”85 
Foreign plaintiffs must overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality 
if the claim arose from acts that occurred abroad by raising a strong inference that 
the actor committed a violation of a “specific, universal, and obligatory” interna-
tional legal norm.86  The mere existence of prudential factors does not divest the 
court’s power to remedy violations of universal law; absent express legislative 
mandate, ATS jurisdiction must be exercised with caution over a norm that satis-
fies the Sosa inquiry.87 
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Displacing the Presumption 
In general, there is a presumption against applying a U.S. statute to conduct 
that occurs in the territory of a foreign sovereign absent express legislative au-
thorization.88  The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum89 (Kiobel II) affirmed that plaintiffs cannot overcome the canon of the 
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction where their allegations do not es-
tablish a nexus of domestic conduct.90  The Court declined to assert jurisdiction 
because Congress did not intend to extend protection of the relevant legislation 
to the foreign litigants in that case.91 
The Court held that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory 
of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application.”92  Notably, Kiobel II did not fore-
close the possibility of liability of corporate actors where a nexus of domestic 
 
84. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–28 (2004). 
85. Id. at 732–33 (footnote omitted). 
86. See id. at 732; see also In re Est. of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, 
and obligatory.” (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980))). 
87. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (noting that 
presumption against extraterritoriality “is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application re-
quires further analysis”).  In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that legislative preemption pre-
cluded extraterritorial application of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) to sales outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States because the focus of the legislation was the “domestic” 
sales of securities.  See id. at 268.   
88. See Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (recognizing appropriate “judicial caution” 
is warranted “in light of foreign policy concerns”). 
89. 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
90. See id. at 124–25 (describing that domestic conduct must be sufficiently definite 
and have been accepted by civilized nations). 
91. See id. at 124.  In order to displace the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic legislation, the plaintiff(s) must establish specific violations through conduct, 
which “can be said to have been the focus of congressional concern.”  Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
92      Id. at 124-25 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265-74 (2010)).  For a further discussion 
of Morrison, see supra note 87. 
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conduct can be established that satisfies modern notions of due process.  Due 
process concerns are satisfied if the court has territorial jurisdiction over the acts, 
in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, or “the defendant’s conduct substan-
tially and adversely affects an important American national interest.”93 
3. Tone at the Top?  Executive Branch May Influence Judicial Discretion on 
Matters of Foreign Affairs 
Since, under the U.S. Constitution, the President has the power to conduct 
foreign relations, several presidential administrations have advised courts on the 
country’s policies in foreign relations in ATS cases.94  For example, in Filartiga, 
“the Carter Administration filed an amicus brief strongly supporting jurisdiction 
under the Alien Tort Statute.”95  Conversely, in Sosa, the Bush Administration 
filed an amicus brief stating an opposing position, suggesting the judicial branch 
did not have authority under the ATS to create or authorize any particular right 
of action without further congressional action.96  Notwithstanding executive pres-
sure, historically, the ATS has “enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very 
limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”97 
 
4. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC: High Court Limits Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Corporations, Raising Red Flags for Four Justices 
In Jesner, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of ATS claims brought by 
foreign victims of terrorism against a corporation.98  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the sole issue of “[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 
categorically forecloses corporate liability.”99  At oral argument, petitioners 
maintained that principles from traditional tort law establish respondeat superior 
 
93.  Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Nestle USA, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 798 (2016).   
94. See Burley, supra note 32, at 463 (summarizing how presidents have influenced the 
development of modern alien tort statute case law).   
95. Id. (citing Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090)).  “Eight years later, . . . the Reagan Admin-
istration” took the opposite position, to “effectively renounce[] the Carter administration’s po-
sition and outline[] a much narrower interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”  Id. at 463, 463 
n.12 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0297 (D. Haw. 
July 18, 1980)). 
96. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).  
97. Id.  
98. See In re Arab Bank (Jesner), 808 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
denied, 822 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub. nom., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. 
Ct. 1432 (2017).  In Jesner, petitioners are aliens, plaintiffs, family members, or estate repre-
sentatives of those injured, captured or killed by terrorists overseas, who claim that respondent, 
a Jordanian bank, financed and facilitated activities of such terrorist organizations.  See Jesner, 
808 F.3d at 147. 
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (No. 16-499); Jesner 
v. Arab Bank, PLC, SCOTUSBLOG , http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/10/16-499-cert-petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KKS-K947] (last visited Jan. 12, 
2018).  
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liability of corporate actors.100  They raise the legitimate concern shared by amici 
that “a categorical bar against corporate liability would itself create foreign rela-
tions problems along the lines the ATS was designed . . . to solve.”101  According 
to petitioners, the common law doctrine of the presumption against extraterrito-
riality as applied in Kiobel II adequately takes into account foreign relations is-
sues.102  Moreover, a bar to corporate liability would foreclose causes of action 
by foreign litigants seeking monetary relief against a corporation for violations 
of international law in a manner that was not intended by the First Continental 
Congress in enacting the ATS in 1789.103 
The parties disagree over whether corporate liability under international law 
is a norm, which must meet Sosa’s “specific, universal, and obligatory” crite-
ria.104  Petitioners maintain that corporate liability is not subject to the Sosa anal-
ysis because liability is determined by the common law doctrine of respondeat 
superior, a rule they maintain is “shared by the vast majority of civilized legal 
systems.”105  At oral argument, Justice Kagan cogently observed that “a norm is 
just a standard of conduct and [does not] have anything to do with enforcement 
of that standard[.]”106 
The respondent contends that if the Court decides to conceptualize corporate 
liability under the “specific, universal, and obligatory” standard espoused in Sosa, 
then there is no such norm that imposes liability on corporations for violations of 
international law.107  However, Justice Sotomayor questioned this reasoning, as-
serting that the “norm is the conduct,” that is the obligation to not finance terror-
ists, engage in piracy, slavery, genocide, or other prohibited crimes against hu-
manity.108  Justice Breyer pointed out that, as a matter of common sense, the 
prohibition of a particular act by treaty ratified by the United States would natu-
rally extend “to the perpetrator being sued . . . such as a corporation or individ-
ual[.]”109 
 
100. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (2018) (No. 16-
499), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-
499_n24m.pdf [https://perma.cc/J223-VBBM] (arguing that “corporations can be held liable in 
civil actions for torts”); id. at 25–26 (describing how traditional tort law imposes respondeat 
superior liability). 
101. Id. at 4. 
102. See id. at 4–5 (maintaining that existing common law doctrine of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is sufficient without needlessly limiting corporate liability). 
103. See id. at 7–8.  Chief Justice Roberts referred back to the “Marbois Incident” and 
asked if extending liability from individuals to corporate defendants would increase “foreign 
entanglements.”  Id. at 7.  In response, petitioners referred to the brief filed by Comparative 
Law Scholars and pointed to several other jurisdictions that permit similar suits for violations 
against the law of nations that occur in other parts of the world.  Id. at 8–9.  For a further 
discussion of the Marbois Incident, see supra notes 43 and accompanying text. 
104. See id. at 24–25 (according to Justice Kennedy, holding corporations liable seem 
to be a norm “in the sense that it tells corporations what they must do [and] how they run their 
business”).  
105. Id. at 25–26. 
106. Id. at 26. 
107. See id. at 41. 
108. See id. at 42. 
109. Id. at 43.  Justice Breyer pointed to the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism, which “says that states must take necessary measures to 
14
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In a 5-4 plurality decision issued on April 24, 2018, five of the nine Supreme 
Court Justices agreed in principle that “absent further action from Congress it 
would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corpora-
tions.”110  Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito argued 
that “[c]reating causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute against foreign cor-
porate defendants would precipitate exactly the sort of diplomatic strife that the 
law was enacted to prevent.”111  Also concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, recently appointed Justice Neil Gorsuch noted that the “practical con-
sequences” of creating a new cause of action “would likely involve questions of 
foreign affairs and national security—matters that implicate neither judicial ex-
pertise nor authority.”112 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan in full; 
the dissent strongly critiqued the reasoning employed by the plurality decision 
and maintained that corporate liability for violations of the law of nations is well-
established in the common law, stating: 
The text, history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and con-
sistent history of corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims for 
law-of-nations violations may be brought against corporations under the 
 
enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable,” and 
concluded “[t]hat sounds like a corporation.  And it sounds like the relation is the same as the 
international norm to the individual who struck the French ambassador in the street.”  Id. at 44. 
110. Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16-499, at *19 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at *20 (plurality opinion) (advocating a heightened separation of 
powers doctrine to avoid judicial matters that risk encroaching on foreign affairs reserved to the 
other branches without explicit authorization from Congress). 
111. Id. at *1 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
112. Id. at *4 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Further, 
Justice Gorsuch opined: 
 
It is for Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations” 
and to regulate foreign commerce.  And it is for the President to resolve diplomatic 
disputes and command the armed forces.  Foreign policy and national security deci-
sions are “delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy” for which “the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities[,] nor responsibility.”  
 
Id. at **4-5 (citations omitted) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).  Compare with Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 
(2004) (“Congress, however, has not only expressed no disagreement with our view of the 
proper exercise of the judicial power, but has responded to its most notable instance by enacting 
legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail.”).  In 2004, the Court ad-
dressed the separation of powers issue as follows: 
 
Section 1350 was enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would ex-
ercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of 
nations; and we know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was 
extended subject to any comparable congressional assumption. Further, our holding 
today is consistent with the division of responsibilities between federal and state 
courts. 
 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19 (citations omitted). 
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ATS.  Nothing about the corporate form in itself raises foreign-policy 
concerns that require the Court, as a matter of common-law discretion, 
to immunize all foreign corporations from liability under the ATS, re-
gardless of the specific law-of-nations violations alleged.113 
C. Circuits Split on the Standard of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability 
Today, foreign tort plaintiffs have the burden of overcoming the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to establish jurisdiction over a cause of action for aiding 
and abetting torts outside the United States’ territorial jurisdiction (extraterritorial 
causes of action).114  The Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have recog-
nized secondary liability for corporate actors for aiding and abetting violations of 
international law.115  Notably, the Second Circuit did not foreclose corporate lia-
bility by applying legislative preemption principles to dismiss claims arising un-
der the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).116 
However, there is a circuit split regarding the specific intent requirements 
for extraterritorial criminal acts.117  The Second and Fourth Circuits require the 
plaintiff’s allegations to raise the inference that the defendant acted “with the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”118  Relying on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, these cases hold that “a purpose 
standard alone has gained ‘the requisite acceptance among civilized nations for 
application in an action under the ATS.’”119 
On the other side of the circuit split, courts have tried to draw on the aiding 
and abetting standard from customary international law according to the actual 
 
113. Id. at *1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
114. See Weatherall supra note 38, at 1380, 1384 (discussing Kiobel II’s “presumption 
against extraterritorial application of the ATS”).   
115. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 2011) (joining its sister circuits 
in recognizing that Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank did not foreclose corporate aiding and 
abetting liability under ATS); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
 654 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that secondary or aiding and abetting liability for 
violations of international law “is well established in customary international law”); see also 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing aiding and 
abetting liability), abrogated by Mohamed v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449 (2012).   
116. See Aziz, 658 F.3d at 392.   
117. Compare id. at 396 (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Inc., 582 F. 
3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (adopting Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring)), with Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950–51 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (adopting knowledge standard).  To summarize the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Khulumani, the court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality and declined to give 
extraterritorial effect to legislation for torts that occurred outside of the United States.  See Khu-
lumani, 503 F.3d at 263.  In Khulumani, the majority required the district court to perform a 
case-by-case analysis and address the extent of any foreign policy concerns.  See id.  In Talis-
man, the court concluded that the Rome Statute imposed a clear purpose standard that requires 
proof that a defendant provided practical assistance, “which has substantial effect on the perpe-
tration of the crime.”  See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 259 (relying on the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999).   
118. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 258 (quoting Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., 
concurring)); see also Aziz, 658 F.3d at 399–400.   
119. Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401 (quoting Talisman, 582 F.3d at 259).   
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standards applied by international tribunals.120  The D.C. Circuit, for instance, 
requires a plaintiff to offer proof that the defendant knowingly provided a specific 
direction that caused a violation of the law of nations.121  The Ninth Circuit de-
clined to definitively answer the question, but noted—in dicta—that knowledge 




III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN NESTLE USA: A GAME-CHANGING 
VICTORY FOR CHILD SLAVES OR BITTERSWEET COLLAPSE OF THE CHOCOLATE 
EMPIRE? 
Seventy percent of the world’s supply of cocoa is cultivated in the African 
country known as the Ivory Coast (“Côte d’Ivoire”).123  The “endemic” use of 
child labor is partly due to a societal expectation within farming families.124  
However, modern cocoa plantations submit children to hard labor, hazardous 
chemicals, and dangerous equipment.125  Ivorian and Malian children harvest co-
coa beans under conditions prohibited by the Worst Forms of Child Labor Con-
vention.126 
 
120. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-1357, 2015 WL, 504218, at *9, 2015 
BL 223859, at *13-14 (D.D.C. July 6, 2015) (discussing decisions from military tribunals cre-
ated to adjudicate legal norms in wake of World War II). 
121. See id.; see also Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. II, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (mem.); Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 69 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D.C.C. 2014) (holding actors account-
able for injuries clearly in violation of domestic and foreign law).  
122. See, e.g., Nestle USA, 766 F.3d 1013, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (“These allegations are 
sufficient to satisfy the mens rea required of an aiding and abetting claim under either a 
knowledge or purpose standard.”), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 798 (2016); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (directing federal courts to apply legal norms in ATS liti-
gation that are accepted by “civilized nations”).   
123. See Nestle USA, 766 F.3d 1013, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 798 
(2016).  “With the United States importing 20% of Côte d’Ivoire’s exports of cocoa products, 
and that number representing almost half of the United States’ supply, child labor likely pro-
duced much of the chocolate products that United States’ consumers enjoy.”  Mustapha, supra 
note 7, at 1164–65 (citations omitted).   
124. See Erika George, Incorporating Rights: Child Labor in African Agriculture and 
the Challenge of Changing Practices in the Cocoa Industry, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
59, 65 (2014) (“Cocoa cultivation is often a family business.  By some estimates, over 90 per-
cent of all cocoa comes from approximately three million small family farmers who depend on 
cocoa cultivation as their primary source of income.” (citations omitted)).   
125. See id. (noting that “[o]f the 819,921 children identified by the U.S. Department 
of Labor study as working in Côte D’Ivoire’s cocoa sector, 50.6 percent of them reported inju-
ries from dangerous activities” (citations omitted)). 
126. See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimi-
nation of the Worse Forms of Child Labor art. 3, June 17, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-5, 1999 
U.S.T. LEXIS 170 [hereinafter ILO Convention 182]; see also Ratifications of C182—Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), INT’L LAB. ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUME
NT_ID:312327 [https://perma.cc/2THY-72UA] (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (noting that United 
States is one of 181 countries that has ratified which binds signatories to take immediate actions 
17
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A. Chocolateering: Domestic Candymakers Lobby to  
Postpone Child Labor Reform–Efforts that Threaten to Melt the Chocolate 
Industry’s Sweet Façade 
The Chocolate Manufacturers Association has taken strident efforts on Cap-
itol Hill to indefinitely postpone reforming its labor practices, despite dissent by 
the media, consumers, political leaders, and even shareholders.127  In an effort to 
impact consumer choice and incentivize the industry to reform, the media publi-
cized the chocolate industry’s “complicity in child labor practices on West Afri-
can cocoa farms.”128  These reports prompted Congressman Elliot Engle to pro-
pose an amendment to the 2002 Agriculture Appropriations Bill of the Food and 
Drug Administration Act that would have enabled a “slave-free” label for choc-
olate made without forced labor.129 
In response, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association hired two former Sen-
ate majority leaders, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, to lobby legislators against 
the labeling requirement.130  The debate led to a compromise known as the 
“Harkin-Engel Protocol”—a voluntary enforcement mechanism adopted by the 
Senate, with the main effect of postponing any potential considerations of man-
datory reforms until International Labor Organization (ILO) Regulation 182 en-
ters into force in 2020.131 
On the day after Halloween in 2012, a representative class of Hershey Choc-
olate shareholders filed a “books and records action” against Hershey Corpora-
tion.132  This action was “relate[d] to the undisputed and unfortunate endemic use 
of child labor on cocoa farms in West Africa.”133  The purpose of the inspection 
was to procure evidence that “Hershey is aware of child labor within its supply 
 
to prohibit and eliminate worst forms of child labor).  
127. See generally Manza, supra note 2.   
128. Mustapha, supra note 7, at 1166; see also Manza, supra note 2, at 396 (“Starting 
in 2001, the media began to uncover the overwhelming use of illicit labor practices in West 
African cocoa farms.” (citation omitted)).  “Media reports on the ‘unlawful and disturbing labor 
practices’ on West African cocoa farms began to circulate in 2001, attracting the attention of 
Congress, according to the complaint.”  Iulia Flip, Hershey Co. Sued for Info on Child Labor, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.courthousenews.com/hershey-co-
sued-forinfo-on-child-labor/ [https://perma.cc/WEP8-83RS]. 
129. See Mustapha, supra note 7, at 1166–67 (citing H. Amend. 142 to Agriculture, 
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
2002 H.R. 2330, 107th Cong. (2001)); see also Manza, supra note 2, at 396 (noting proposed 
amendment that “would require labels on cocoa products that signified whether the supply chain 
was ‘slave-free.’” (citation omitted)).  
130. See Mustapha, supra note 7, at 1167.   
131. See George, supra note 124, at 69–70; see also Master’s Report, La. Mun. Police 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. 7996, 2013 WL 4549659, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 273, at 
*9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Hershey Derivative Litigation Master’s Report].  For 
a further discussion of ILO Regulation 182, see supra note 14 and infra note 175. 
132. See La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co. (Hershey Derivative Litiga-
tion), No. 7996, 2013 WL 6120439, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2013) (noting that shareholders’ 
purpose was to demand inspection of breaches of fiduciary duty by Hershey directors relating 
to unlawful child labor on cocoa farms in West Africa); see also Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 220 
(2010) (establishing standard for books and record action).   
133. Hershey Derivative Litigation, 2013 WL 6120439, at *2. 
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chain, but will not take action to end its reliance on ill-gotten cocoa until 2020.”134  
Hershey moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the shareholders failed to state 
a proper purpose.135  Upon the advice of a special master, the Delaware Chancery 
Court dismissed the shareholders’ action for failing to assert a credible basis that 
Hershey had incorporated unlawful child labor into its business strategy to infer 
any violations of foreign or domestic law.136 
 
B. Facts and Procedural History of Nestle USA 
In the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Global Ex-
change, a San Francisco-based human rights organization, filed suit on behalf of 
a proposed class of Malian children between the ages of twelve and fourteen years 
old who were forced to work for up to eighty-four hours each week on cocoa 
plantations in Côte d’Ivoire.137  Plaintiffs alleged that Nestle USA, Inc. (Nestle), 
Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), Cargill Incorporated Company, and 
Cargill Cocoa (Cargill) (collectively defendants) aided and abetted “violations of 
international law norms that prohibit slavery; forced labor; child labor; torture; 
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”138  They asked the district court for 
injunctive relief for violations of the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 
the TVPA, as well as monetary damages for claims under state tort law, including 
unjust enrichment and unfair business practices.139 
1. Specific Allegations of Aiding and Abetting Forced Child Labor 
Plaintiffs claimed that the “[d]efendants had first hand knowledge of the 
widespread use of child labor on said farms.”140  According to the plaintiffs, Nes-
tle exerts a high degree of control over cocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire.141  They 
alleged that Nestle aided cocoa agriculture by providing financial and technical 
farming assistance through “money, supplies, and training . . . knowing that their 
assistance would necessarily facilitate child labor.”142  With regard to Nestle’s 
 
134. Id. at *3.   
135. See id. at *5.  
136. See id. at *12.  The special master found the evidence, articles, and sources too 
attenuated to infer a credible basis of wrongdoing. See Hershey Derivative Litigation Master’s 
Report, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 273, at *7–8. 
137. See Doe I v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1076 (“The plaintiffs . . . 
allege that they were forced to work ‘cutting, gathering, and drying’ cocoa beans for twelve to 
fourteen hours a day, six days a week.” (quoting First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 57–59, Doe v. 
Nestle S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal 2010) (No. 205-cv-5133))).   
138. Id. at 1064. 
139. See id. at 1064–65 (alleging that Defendants aided and abetted torture); see also 
id. at 1114–15 (alleging defendants received direct benefit from forced labor practices and owe 
restitution to former child slave plaintiffs). 
140. Complaint at ¶ 44, Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal 2010) (No. 205-cv-
5133).   
141. See Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (describing high degree of control that Nestle 
maintains over agriculture in Cote D’Ivoire).   
142. Id. at 1066 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 52, Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (No. 205-cv-5133)). 
19
Wilkinson: Piercing the Cocoa Veil: Ninth Circuit Allows Child Cocoa Slaves
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
2018] PIERCING THE CHOCOLATE VEIL 39	
cooperative suppliers, they alleged that defendant ADM exerts a high-degree of 
control over the agricultural production and frequently interacts with Ivorian 
farmers,143 and that defendant Cargill operates a cocoa processing plant that failed 
to report forced labor practices in breach of its ISO certification.144  The plaintiffs 
maintained that the Northern District of California was a proper venue because 
the foreign judicial system would not provide effective relief, partially because 
of high rates of corruption in Côte d’Ivoire and lack of an effective legal forum 
in Mali.145  
The issue before the district court was whether these allegations raised legit-
imate inferences that defendants knowingly aided and abetted forced child labor 
through their control over the cocoa market.146  Plaintiffs pointed to domestic 
conduct, such as the chocolate manufacturers’ lobby, arguing that the defendants 
obtained a direct benefit from postponing labor reform to sustain their “ongoing, 
cheap supply of cocoa by maintaining exclusive supplier/buyer relationships with 
local farms and/or farmer cooperatives in Cote d’Ivoire.”147  Nestle and its coop-
erative suppliers did not specifically deny the allegations that a nexus of conduct 
in the United States facilitated the flow of money, equipment, and training to 
Ivorian farmers, with the knowledge that such assistance would facilitate the 
farmers’ use of forced child labor child labor, torture, and cruel, inhuman, and 
 
143. See id. at 1065 (discussing ADM Cocoa’s direct contact with Ivorian farmers and 
power to influence production processes).   
144. See id. at 1066 (describing Cargill’s ISO certification for “cocoa buying stations 
in Daloa and Gognoa”).   
145. See id. at 1064.  In the complaint, plaintiffs stated the following reasons for bring-
ing suit in the California district court: 
 
(1) there is no law in Mali allowing civil damages for their injuries caused by non-
Malian cocoa exporters (as all Defendants are American, European, or Ivorian cor-
porations); (2) no suit can be brought in Cote d’Ivoire because “the judicial system 
is notoriously corrupt and would likely be unresponsive to the claims of foreign chil-
dren against major cocoa corporations operating in and bringing significant revenue 
to Cote d’Ivoire”; (3) Plaintiffs and their attorneys would be subjected to possible 
harm in Cote d’Ivoire on account of general civil unrest and “the general hostility 
by  cocoa producers in the region”; and (4) the United States has provided an appro-
priate forum for these claims through the [ATS] and the Torture Victim Protection 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).   
In addition, Cote D’Ivoire’s level of public corruption is extremely high.  The 2014 
Corruption Perceptions Index examined public sector corruption in 175 countries; 92% of Sub-
Saharan African countries scored in the bottom fiftieth percentile, making it the most corrupt 
continent in the world.  The CPI gave each country a score ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 
100 (very clean).  The 2014 CPI for La Côte D’Ivoire was 32.  Out of all 175 countries, La Côte 
D’Ivoire tied for 115th; it was perceived as less corrupt than Nigeria (136th), and more corrupt 
than Ethiopia or Mali (110th).  See Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
SECRETARIAT (2014), https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational /docs/2014_cpibro-
chure_en/12 [https://perma.cc/GCL3-V4KW] (providing statistics that rank 160 countries and 
territories based on how corrupt they are perceived to be). 
146. See Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (citation omitted). 
147. Id. at 1064 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
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degrading treatment in violation of international legal norms.148  The plaintiffs 
argued that the defendants’ conduct taken as a whole led to the “overwhelming 
conclusion” that the defendants had likely committed a violation of international 
law.149 
2. District Court’s Analysis 
The district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish corporate liability for violations of 
international law.150  The court recognized that the plaintiffs raised the legitimate 
inference that the “[d]efendants knew or should have known of the labor viola-
tions on the Ivorian farms.”151  However, the court rendered the following con-
clusions: Congress did not intend protections under the TVPA to extend to plain-
tiffs in this case;152 the ATS did not provide jurisdiction for aiding and abetting 
for “ordinary commercial transactions[;]”153 and “the aider and abettor’s assis-
tance must bear a causative relationship to the specific wrongful conduct com-
mitted by the principal.”154  The court found the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to 
establish that Defendants acted with the requisite actus reus and mens rea required 
by international law.155  Further, the court concluded that no international norm 
existed to establish corporate liability.156  According to the district court, the de-
fendants’ “tacit encouragement” of child labor practices and “specific wrongful 
acts[,]” such as “Ivorian farmers’ acts of whipping, beating, threatening, confin-
ing, and depriving plaintiffs” did not give rise to a corporate aiding and abetting 
violation of the law of nations.157 
The plaintiffs vehemently opposed the district court’s ruling in Nestle USA 
 
148. See id.   
149. See id. at 1109 (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments urging district court to consider 
allegations collectively as establishing a violation of international norms). 
150. See id. at 1143 (“[P]laintiffs must bear the burden to show that international law 
does recognize corporate liability.”).   
151. Id. at 1110.   
152. See id. at 1144.   
153. See id. at 1109 (“However, even viewing Plaintiffs’ allegations collectively rather 
than separately, the overwhelming conclusion is that Defendants were purchasing cocoa and 
assisting the production of cocoa.  It is clear from the caselaw [sic] that ordinary commercial 
transactions do not lead to aiding and abetting liability.” (emphasis omitted)); see id. at 1067 
(reasoning that “Sosa sharply circumscribed the availability of private causes of action that are 
cognizable in federal courts under [the ATS]” (emphasis omitted)).   
154. Id. at 1081 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
155. See id. at 1110 (reasoning that plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that they “can-
not . . . allege that Defendants acted with the purpose and intent that their conduct would per-
petuate child slavery on Ivorian farms”).  See id. at 1109-10 (reasoning that defendants were 
primarily engaged in “ordinary commercial transactions” in their “purchasing cocoa and assist-
ing the production of cocoa” and did not establish that their “conduct ha[d] a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the specific crime” viewing plaintiff’s allegations individually).   
156. See id. at 1143 (concluding that “no court ha[d] yet identified a sufficiently well-
defined and universally recognized international law norm establishing corporate liability in the 
first place”).   
157. Id. at 1111 (citing Complaint at ¶¶ 57–59, Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. 
Cal 2010) (No. 205-cv-5133)). 
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that no court had established an international norm establishing corporate liabil-
ity.158  The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit to establish the ATS allowed 
for jurisdiction over a corporate actor for aiding and abetting violations of inter-
national law.159 
C. Victory Is Sweet: Ninth Circuit Focused on Holding Nestle Accountable 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the district court’s 
decision.160  The Ninth Circuit remanded to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to 
amend their complaint.161  Of particular significance, the Ninth Circuit did not 
foreclose corporate liability for violations of universal law and found that the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation does not bar suits 
brought against corporate actors for violations of the law of nations.162 
1. The Prohibition Against Slavery Applies to State Actors and Non-State 
Actors: There Is No Exception for Corporate Offenders 
To determine whether corporate liability exists for a particular norm, the 
Ninth Circuit instructed the lower courts “to apply customary international law 
to determine the nature and scope of the norm underlying the plaintiffs’ claim,”163 
and courts must determine if the prohibition applies to state actors or private ac-
tors or if the norm alleged is universal such that it would apply to all actors at all 
times.164  Although the plaintiffs argued that the “knowledge that the aider and 
abettor’s  acts would facilitate the commission of the underlying offense,” the 
Ninth Circuit did “not decide whether a purpose or knowledge standard applie[d] 
to aiding and abetting ATS claims.”165  Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
 
158. See id. 1145 (“It appears to the [District] Court that Plaintiffs hold a very different 
view of the legal principles discussed in this Order.  If that is the case, Plaintiffs would be well-
advised to consider filing an appeal rather than filing an amended complaint.”).  For a further 
discussion of Jesner, see supra notes 98–113 and accompanying text. 
159. See Nestle USA, 766 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that proposed class 
of child plaintiffs declined to amend their complaint and went straight to circuit court). 
160. See id. at 1028 (declining to apply Kiobel II’s “amorphous touch and concern 
test”). 
161. See id. (observing that Morrison’s focus is used to discern Congress’s intent when 
passing statutes, reasoning that it “cannot sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which are common 
law claims based on international legal norms”).  For a further discussion of Morrison, see supra 
note 87 and accompanying text. 
162. See id. at 1022. 
163. Id. at 1022.  
164. See id. at 1020 (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 760, 765 (9th Cir. 2011)).   
165. Id. at 1023–24.  Plaintiffs argued that the “knowledge standard has also been em-
braced by contemporary international criminal tribunals.”  Id. at 1023; see also Khulumani, 504 
F.3d at 277-79 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that international criminal tribunal decisions 
have applied knowledge standard).  But see Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that defendant must act purposefully to satisfy the 
mens rea for aiding and abetting under ATS based on application of international law).  The 
Talisman court concluded that ATS permits accessorial liability for violations of international 
law, but only if the attendant conduct was purposeful.  See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 259.  See also 
Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding same). 
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the plaintiffs raised the reasonable inference that the defendants acted with the 
purpose of facilitating child slavery by providing financial assistance to the farm-
ing operations, maximizing revenue, and reducing production costs.166  The Ninth 
Circuit remanded to the trial court with instructions to look to domestic tort law 
to determine whether recovery from the corporation is permissible.167  Of partic-
ular significance, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a violation of the prohibition 
against slavery is a violation of universal customary law that may be asserted 
against corporate actors.168 
 
 
2. Critical Analysis: The Dark Chocolate Truth 
 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted Nestle USA’s petition for rehearing 
en banc, and the Ninth Circuit judges ultimately denied relief.  Nestle USA and 
its cooperative suppliers petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for 
certiorari, which the Court denied in January 2016.169  In this case, the district 
court failed to allow plaintiffs’ claims to survive summary judgment, which is a 
necessary prerequisite to remedy the rights of foreigners and embrace basic prin-
ciples of human dignity protected by universal law as intended by the First Con-
tinental Congress.170  The Ninth Circuit’s decision and denial of certiorari clari-
fies that the ATS provides a basis for jurisdiction over tort claims of foreign 
victims asserted against corporate actors for violations of universal law.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nestle USA confirmed that the prohibition of slavery 
is a universal norm of international law that applies to state and private actors.171 
The Ninth Circuit did not foreclose the possibility of a knowledge standard 
to establish aiding and abetting liability, which can be drawn from international 
tribunals.172  According to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting is established by “all acts of assistance in the 
 
166. See Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1024–25 (noting defendant’s control over cocoa mar-
ket in Ivory Coast). 
167. See id. at 1022 (holding court should apply “domestic tort law to determine 
whether recovery from the corporation is permissible”).  
168. See id. (“We conclude that the prohibition against slavery is universal and may be 
asserted against the corporate defendants in this case.”).  
169. 136 S. Ct. 798 (2018). 
170. See generally Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010).   
171. See Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1020 (adopting corporate liability analysis from Sarei 
to conclude that “norms were universal or applicable to all actors, and, consequently, applicable 
to corporations” (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted)).  
The Supreme Court has focused on the main object of ATS that is the conduct of the 
states; indeed, many prohibitions only apply to state action, and “an important issue in ATS 
litigation can be determining whether the norm asserted by the plaintiff is applicable to both 
state actors and private actors.”  See id (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 
165 (2d Cir. 2010))  
172. See id. at 1023-1024 (declining to decide whether purpose or knowledge standard 
applied because plaintiffs’ allegations met more stringent purpose standard). 
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form of either physical or moral support’ that ‘substantially contribute to the com-
mission of the crime.”173  Under the standards applied by international tribunals, 
“[i]t is not necessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, 
in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime.”174  Nestle USA joins a 
trend of similar human rights victories toward enhanced accountability for cor-
porations and global labor standards.175  In Doe v. Unocal Corp., the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was held out as evidence that forced labor or slav-
ery is a jus cogens violation of the law of nations.176 
IV. IMPACT: FOSTERING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GLOBAL CORPORATIONS 
In a globalized economy, where MNCs have a growing tendency to cause 
international friction, the courts need guidance on the scope of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to remedy violations of the law of nations under the ATS.  Kiobel II 
indicates that “mere corporate presence” is a relevant factor to determining juris-
diction under the ATS, but it is not dispositive to rebutting the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.177   
Recent cases highlight the potential for different results depending on venue.  
The Fifth Circuit upheld dismissal of claims brought pursuant to the Trafficking 
Victims Protections Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and state common law.178  
 
173. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950 (quoting Prosecutor v. Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T 45, ¶ 
126 (Rwanda Jan. 27, 2000)).  Under Article 2(2)(e) of the Rome Statute, the Tribunal had 
power to prosecute genocide, which by definition included “forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.”  Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T 52, at ¶ 150.  Under Article 3(c) and (f), 
it could prosecute enslavement and torture.  See id. at 6, ¶ 3.  Article 6 incorporates a broad 
definition of individual criminal responsibility, which extends to government officials, subor-
dinates, and supervisors.  Id. at 9, ¶ 5.  
174. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1 T (Dec. 10, 
1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, ¶ 245 (1999)). 
175. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason, Compliance of the United States 
with International Labor Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1876 (2014) (noting that ILO Conven-
tion 182 prohibits child labor); REPORT OF THE AUGUST 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS DELEGATION 
TO HERSHEY, PA. 11 n.27 (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/international 
justice/Hersheys.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZY4-LFH5] (noting goal of eliminating employment 
discrimination); see also ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work art. 
2, June 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1237, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-dec-
laration/documents/publication/wcms_467653.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SLG-BTE7] (advocating 
signatories’ “respect, to promote and to realize” by virtue of their participation “the elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.”). 
176. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that 
forced labor has achieved status of jus cogens violation recognized in Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights).  For a further discussion of jus cogens, see supra notes 65–74.   
177. See Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 594–95 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that Kiobel 
II recognized that citizenship is relevant factor to ATS jurisdiction, but is not dispositive); see 
also In re Arab Bank, 822 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jacobs, J. concurring), cert. 
granted sub. nom., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017).   
178. See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that Congress did not intend the TVPRA to apply retroactively and extraterritorially at 
time of alleged conduct in 2004), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 134 (2017). 
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However, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the extraterritorial nature of the plain-
tiffs’ TVPA claims did not prevent the court from considering their merits.179  
The D.C. Circuit and Ninth Circuit have applied the standards of international 
tribunals to determine whether the allegations state a claim for violating the law 
of nations.180  Assessing congressional intent behind the reach of a statute and 
whether corporate conduct abroad sufficiently touches and concerns the United 
States will most likely dominate alien tort litigation for many years to come.181  
It is not clear from existing case law what distinctions the court must make 
between legislation and causes of action arising under the law of nations due to 
competing interpretations from Sosa and Kiobel II.182  The Jesner Court does not 
help this confusion; the plurality vacillates over the justiciability of ATS claims 
against foreign corporations and obfuscates the proper role and application of the 
law of nations in the modern era.  The plurality acknowledges that corporate lia-
bility has been determined with reasonable certainty by several circuit courts and 
acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe I v. Nestle USA.183  According 
to the four Justices who dissented, however, “the plurality fundamentally mis-
conceives how international law works and so misapplies the first step of 
Sosa.”184  By assuming that no norm of corporate liability based on international 
 
179. See Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 602 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that legislative history 
of TVPA supported “Act’s intended extraterritoriality”).   
180. See Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1028–29 (“[S]ince the focus test turns on discerning 
Congress’s intent when passing a statute, it cannot sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which 
are common law claims based on international legal norms.”); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
No. 01-1357, 2015 WL, 504218, at *8–10, 2015 BL 223859, at *13–14 (D.D.C. July 6, 2015) 
(applying cases from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ICTR) to aiding and abetting liability). 
181. For a further discussion of the impact of Kiobel II, see, e.g., Gregory H. Fox & 
Yunjoo Goze, International Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 92-Nov MICH. B.J. 44, 46 
(2013) (describing impact that Kiobel II decision will have on ATS litigation). 
182. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16-499, at *6 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018) (plurality opin-
ion).  Should district courts attempt to interpret legislation’s extraterritorial effect uniformly 
across the circuits?  Does the standard for the exercise of jurisdiction depend on the sufficiency 
of the allegations that touch and concern the United States or the definiteness of the violation 
of the law of nations alleged?  See, e.g., Nestle USA, 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014)  
(“[I]ssue of corporate liability has been more thoroughly examined in the circuit courts, which 
have disagreed about whether and under what circumstances corporations can face liability for 
ATS claims.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016).  Cf. Adhikari v. Daoud 
& Partners, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1018 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2015)  (disagreeing with Nestle USA that 
Kiobel II’s “touch and concern” test was not same as Morrison’s “focus test” (citation omitted)), 
aff’d 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017). 
183. See Jesner, No. 16-499 at *6 (citing circuit court opinions). 
184. Jesner, No. 16-499 at *2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). With regard to the plurality’s 
inquiry into a “categorical question [of] whether corporations may be sued under the ATS as a 
general matter[,]” Justice Sotomayor opined: 
 
International law imposes certain obligations that are intended to govern the behavior 
of states and private actors.  Among those obligations are substantive prohibitions on 
certain conduct thought to violate human rights, such as genocide, slavery, extraju-
dicial killing, and torture . . . . 
 
Although international law determines what substantive conduct violates the law of 
nations, it leaves the specific rules of how to enforce international-law norms and 
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tribunals, the Jesner plurality failed to consider that “[n]o international tribunal 
has been created and endowed with the jurisdiction to hold natural persons civilly 
(as opposed to criminally) liable.”185 Moreover, it is well-established, as a matter 
of customary international law, that many civilized nations, including England, 
France, the Netherlands, and Canada allow corporate liability for international-
law violations.186 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach to establishing ATS jurisdiction over a corpo-
rate actor offers moral guidance.  The district courts should embrace the ATS as 
a basis for deterring MNCs from violating international law and for compensating 
victims for corporate violations of international law.  The ATS provides the 
courts with jurisdiction to impose liability on a corporate actor for a violation of 
universal law committed against foreigners abroad.187  As noted by one scholar, 
“given the paucity of statutory guidance, any judicial construction of the law of 
nations for purposes of the ATS—made necessary by congressional silence—
would similarly constitute a judicially imposed limitation.”188  When courts self-
impose limitations on their prescriptive jurisdiction through superficial legisla-
tive deference and tolerance of defendants’ “reverse” forum-shopping, they dis-
enfranchise foreign victims.189  The judiciary must ensure the respect for the 
 
remedy their violation to states, which may act to impose liability collectively 
through treaties or independently via their domestic legal systems . . . . 
 
Again, the question of who must undertake the prohibited conduct for there to be a 
violation of an international-law norm is one of international law, but how a particu-
lar actor is held liable for a given law-of-nations violation generally is a question of 
enforcement left up to individual states. 
 
Id. at **2-3, 8 (internal citations omitted). 
185. Id. at 9. 
186. Id. at 12 (“Finally, a number of states, acting individually, have imposed criminal 
and civil liability on corporations for law-of-nations violations through their domestic legal 
systems.”) (citations omitted) 
187.  See Motion for Int’l. Law Scholars for Leave to File as Amici Curia in Supporting 
Appellants, Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 2011 WL 3436966, at *1–2 (9th Cir. July 29, 2011) (No. 
10-56739) (arguing that District Court “erred by suggesting that international law does not al-
low for the imposition of civil liability on corporations”).  Nine of the world’s leading scholars 
of international law and human rights wrote in an amici brief that: 
 
Contrary to the District Court’s decision, international law extends liabil-
ity to corporations and other non-state actors.  A diverse array of treaties 
reveals the accepted understanding within the international community 
that corporations can be held liable for violations of international law.  To 
suggest that international law does not recognize corporate liability is con-
trary to established law, practice, and reason. 
 
Id. at *3.  
188. Weatherall, supra note 38, at 1382–83 (emphasis added and omitted). 
189. See, e.g., Roger Alford, Reverse Foreign Shopping, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 11, 2008), 
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/2
46 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 63: p. 20 
rights of foreigners who are injured by American nationals to promote justice and 
eschew the creation of a forum that is a safe harbor for tortfeasors. 
The Jesner plurality diverges from the jurisprudence in this field by advo-
cating for a heightened separation of powers limitation.  Notably, however, Jes-
ner “made no finding” with respect to ATS jurisdiction over corporations domi-
ciled in the United States.190   It is clear that corporate presence alone cannot rebut 
the presumption against extraterritoriality; whenever a court exercises extraterri-
torial jurisdiction, it should recognize the interests of foreign tort victims and aim 
to deter illegal corporate conduct, while considering countervailing factors, in-
cluding credible evidence of a legitimate conflict with foreign policy or national 
security interests.191  When confronted with a motion to dismiss ATS claims on 
the basis of forum non conveniens, the court cannot disregard plaintiffs’ allega-
tions without applying the conflict of laws principles of the forum, considering 
international treaties, universal law, the availability of any alternative forum, 
comity, and deterring corporate misconduct in the interest of justice.192   
It is important in a globalized multilateral system for federal courts to em-
brace ATS jurisdiction to remedy violations of jus cogens, especially when one 
considers the crippling corruption that exists in countries with ineffective politi-
cal and legal systems, legislative inaction, and present unlikelihood of any mul-
tilateral global regulatory framework.193  To accomplish the intent of the First 
Continental Congress, to create a strong, independent judicial branch with origi-
nal jurisdiction, human rights lawyers can remove the veil that disguises inhu-
mane acts aided and abetted by corporate misconduct.  The history and present 
confirm the need for the district courts to provide a forum for foreigners injured 




ing obstacles plaintiffs face when defendants engage in “reverse foreign shopping”); Nita Ghei 
& Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts Law 
as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2004) (describing myriad conflicts 
of law issues that pose issues particularly for plaintiffs suing in “a legal regime where parties 
have the choice of alternative forums”).  
190. See, e.g., Volterra Fietta, Jesner et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC – The United States Su-
preme Court decides that foreign corporations may not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=88d8a9e2-
b41e-4940-851f-383b1feaa353 [https://perma.cc/ZC4K-DFRG] (noting that “the [Jesner] 
Court held that foreign domiciled corporations are not proper defendants in ATS cases but made 
no finding with respect to US domiciled corporations”). 
191. See, e.g., Mujika v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 615 (9th Cir. 2014) (granting mo-
tion to dismiss based on legitimate conflict with national interests).  
192. See id. at 596–99 (discussing standards of adjudicatory comity and prudential in-
ternational comity); see also id. at 605 (noting that Kiobel II does not address those two doc-
trines).  For a further discussion of forum non conveniens, see Baldwin supra note 82 and ac-
companying text. 
193. See Christina P. Skinner, RICO and International Legal Ethics, 40 YALE J. INT’L 
L. ONLINE 20, 22 (Fall 2014) (“Even if there were a coherent international ‘code of conduct,’ 
there is no supranational regulatory body to credibly enforce it.” (citation omitted)). 
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